The confounding effects of heterogeneity in biological psychiatry and psychiatric genetics have been widely discussed in the literature. We suggest an approach in which heterogeneity may be put to use in hypothesis testing, and may find application in evaluation of the Crespi & Badcock (C&B) imprinting hypothesis. Here we consider three potential sources of etiologic subtypes for analysis.

Effects of linguistic labels on learning outcomes are well-established; however, developmental research examining possible mechanisms underlying these effects have provided mixed results. We used a novel paradigm where 8-year-olds and adults were simultaneously trained on three sparse categories (categories with many irrelevant or unique features and a single rule defining feature). Category members were either associated with the same label, different labels, or no labels (silent baseline). Similar to infant paradigms, participants passively viewed individual exemplars and we examined fixations to (...) category relevant features across training. While it is well established that adults can optimize their attention in forced-choice categorization tasks without linguistic input, the present findings provide support for label induced attention optimization: simply hearing the same label associated with different exemplars was associated with increased attention to category relevant features over time, and participants continued to focus on these features on a subsequent recognition task. Participants also viewed images longer and made more fixations when images were paired with unique labels. These findings provide support for the claim that labels may facilitate categorization by directing attention to category relevant features. (shrink)

Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science has been the subject of repeated misunderstanding. This discussion takes one recent example and shows how Winch's argument is gravely distorted. What is at issue is not, as is usually supposed, whether we can accept or endorse another society's explanations of its activities, but whether we have to look for an explanatory connection between concepts and action. Winch's argument is that before we can try to explain actions, we have to identify them (...) correctly. This can only be done by seeing how they, and the concepts they are associated with, fit within a way of life. Grasping its rule?following character is understanding action. Once the difficulties in making such identifications are appreciated, we will be less inclined to accept facile explanations why people in other societies do the things they do. (shrink)

This study expands the application of deonance theory into organizations’ upper echelons by examining how CEOs imprinted with a sense of duty can influence managerial decision-making. We hypothesize an imprint of bounded autonomy, an ought-force that constrains their decision-making and understanding of behavioral freedom, influences duty-bound CEOs to self-report errors in past financial reporting. We test deonance theory propositions of instrumentality for behavioral expansion, namely loss avoidance and gain attainment, related to institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership. We use (...) CEOs that are graduates of U.S. service academies as a proxy for duty-bound executives and find firms they lead are more likely to issue a financial restatement to correct a previous reporting error. This finding is robust to alternate explanations such as being error-prone, earnings management, auditor oversight, and risk behaviors. We also find evidence that deonance may be subject to behavioral expansion. The likelihood of issuing a restatement decreases as institutional ownership concentration and CEO equity ownership increases. This study shows imprinted deonance within the C-suite influences important organizational outcomes. (shrink)

DIE BESTIMMUNG DER PHILOSOPH IE 1M DEUTSCHEN I. IDEALISMUS I 2. VERNUNFT UND SPRACHE 2I VERNUNFT UND LEBENSWELT 3· 45 LEBENSWELT UND LEBENSWELTEN 63 4· DIE BESTIMMUNG DES ANDERSANFANGLICHEN 5· DENKENS 8 7 6. DIE WELT 1M ANDEREN ANFANG - DIE ROLLE DES DICHTERS UND DAS "DICHTERISCHE WOHNEN" 8 9 VORWORT In der heutigen Zeit, in der auf vielen Gebieten die iiberkommenen Gedanken ihre Geltung und Wirkungskraft verloren haben, liegt vielleicht die Aufgabe der Philo sophie darin, bewahrend auf die iiberlieferten (...) Prinzipien und die in ihnen liegenden Bestim­ mungen und Grundprobleme zuriickzuschauen und dabei zu­ gleich zu beachten, was in ihnen "iibergangig" auf Neues hin­ weist, um so fiir aIle Versuche eines "anderen Anfangs" kritisch offen zu sein. Ein Philosophieren, das sich dergestalt " zwischen" Tradition und anderem Anfang bewegt, hat sein Dilemma durch­ schaut: Es bleibt auf der Suche nach dem Wahren, obwohl es keinen giiltigen Wahrheitsbegriff hat. Ein allein aus transzen­ dentaler Subjektivitat begriindeter Wahrheitsbegriff iiberzeugt es nicht mehr, und Wahrheit, wie sie dem erfahrenden Ver­ stehen "geschieht," ist in ihrem Wesen noch nicht zureichend bestimmt worden. Hat sich das Philosophieren so erkannt, wird es sich nicht einseitig auf die eine oder die andere Position fest­ legen; vielmehr wird es seine Aufgabe gerade darin sehen, den Gedanken in Bewegung zu halten. Diese Auffassung eines heutigen Philosophierens soIl die hier vor­ gelegte Sammlung von Aufsatzen bezeugen. (shrink)

As a contribution to current debates on the ‘social life of methods’, in this article we present an ethnomethodological study of the role of understanding within statistical practice. After reviewing the empirical turn in the methods literature and the challenges to the qualitative-quantitative divide it has given rise to, we argue such case studies are relevant because they enable us to see different ways in which ‘methods’, here quantitative methods, come to have a social life – by embodying and exhibiting (...) understanding they ‘make the social structures of everyday activities observable’ ( Garfinkel, 1967 : 75), thereby putting society on display. Exhibited understandings rest on distinctive lines of practical social and cultural inquiry – ethnographic ‘forays’ into the worlds of the producers and users of statistics – which are central to good statistical work but are not themselves quantitative. In highlighting these non-statistical forms of social and cultural inquiry at work in statistical practice, our case study is an addition to understandings of statistics and usefully points to ways in which studies of the social life of methods might be further developed from here. (shrink)

Drawing from Goffman’s original observations on stigma and the consequences of interactions between the stigmatized and supportive or stigmatizing audiences, we conduct a 20-year review of the diverse literature on stigma to revisit the collective nature of stigmatization processes. We find that studies on stigma’s origins, responses, processes, and outcomes have diverged from Goffman’s relational view of stigma as they have overlooked important relational mechanisms explaining the processes of (de)stigmatization. We draw from those conclusions to justify the need to study (...) stigma as a collective phenomenon. We develop a relational perspective on stigma based on understanding how attributes are stigmatized (or not) by audiences in their interactions. We argue that to advance stigma research, it is necessary to build on Goffman’s theory to include the stigmatizers (i.e., the normal) and supporters (i.e., the wise); how they create, sustain, or remove stigma; and how they relate to the stigmatized (i.e., the targets). Accordingly, we provide a research agenda on stigma as a collective phenomenon that theorizes a relational perspective, proposes a typology of how audiences relate to stigmatization, and identifies patterns of relations between audiences. We thus offer a missing piece to existing accounts of stigma by focusing on the key role of audiences (i.e., stigmatizers or supporters of the stigmatized) rather than on the targets of stigma (i.e., the own). (shrink)

This anthology is the first devoted exclusively to On Certainty. The essays are grouped under four headings: the Framework, Transcendental, Epistemic and Therapeutic readings, and an introduction helps explain why these readings need not be seen as antagonistic. Contributions from W.H. Brenner, Alice Crary, Michael Kober, Edward Minar, Howard Mounce, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Thomas Morawetz, D.Z. Phillips, Duncan Pritchard, Rupert Read, Anthony Rudd, Joachim Schulte, Avrum Stroll, Michael Williams.

Focusing on a discussion by Ruddich and Stassen of the ?Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough?, this paper shows that some of the usual criticisms made by sociologists of Wittgenstein are misplaced. He does not reject causal explanations of beliefs and actions and replace them with some other form of explanation, but dismisses the idea that any explanation is called for here. His argument that the origin of the desire to explain beliefs is to be found in a misconceived parallel between (...) science and magic is explained and discussed. (shrink)

In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker addresses what he takes to be misconceptions of Wittgenstein's philosophy with respect to (1) the periodisation of his thought and to what should properly be counted as part of his work; (2) his conception of grammar since the Big Typescript (1929–33); and (3) his conception of philosophy as grammatical investigation. I argue that Hacker's restrictive conception of what ought to be considered part of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his conservative view of Wittgensteinian (...) grammar are unjustified and prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary importance of On Certainty for epistemology. Finally, while agreeing that Wittgenstein views philosophy as grammatical elucidation, I suggest some reasons for the resistance that this view has generated.In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” Peter Hacker deals with three of the “many misunderstandings, misrepresentations and misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy” (2012, 1); the first of which concerns “the periodisation of Wittgenstein's thought”; the second, the supposition that what Wittgenstein called “grammar” in PI differed fundamentally from, and was more limited than, his conception of it when he was writing the Big Typescript; and the third, the claim that what Wittgenstein took to be grammatical statements are, in fact, dogmatisms, theories or doctrines inconsistent with his meta‐philosophical remarks in PI. I address each of these concerns seriatim. (shrink)

In his later years, Wesley Salmon believed that the two dominant models of scientific explanation (his own causal-mechanical model and the unificationist model) were reconcilable. Salmon envisaged a 'new consensus' about explanation: he suggested that the two models represent two 'complementary' types of explanation, which may 'peacefully coexist' because they illuminate different aspects of scientific understanding. This paper traces the development of Salmon's ideas and presents a critical analysis of his complementarity thesis. Salmon's thesis is rejected on the basis (...) of two objections, and an alternative view of the relation between different types of explanation is proposed. (shrink)

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 78, Issue 1, Page 126-129, Winter 2020.

Viewing the language of modal logic as a language for describing directed graphs, a natural type of directed graph to study modally is one where the nodes are sets and the edge relation is the subset or superset relation. A well-known example from the literature on intuitionistic logic is the class of Medvedev frames $\langle W,R\rangle$ where $W$ is the set of nonempty subsets of some nonempty finite set $S$, and $xRy$ iff $x\supseteq y$, or more liberally, where $\langle W,R\rangle$ (...) is isomorphic as a directed graph to $\langle \wp(S)\setminus\{\emptyset\},\supseteq\rangle$. Prucnal [32] proved that the modal logic of Medvedev frames is not finitely axiomatizable. Here we continue the study of Medvedev frames with extended modal languages. Our results concern definability. We show that the class of Medvedev frames is definable by a formula in the language of tense logic, i.e., with a converse modality for quantifying over supersets in Medvedev frames, extended with any one of the following standard devices: nominals (for naming nodes), a difference modality (for quantifying over those $y$ such that $x\not= y$), or a complement modality (for quantifying over those $y$ such that $x\not\supseteq y$). It follows that either the logic of Medvedev frames in one of these tense languages is finitely axiomatizable---which would answer the open question of whether Medvedev's [31] "logic of finite problems'' is decidable---or else the minimal logics in these languages extended with our defining formulas are the beginnings of infinite sequences of frame-incomplete logics. (shrink)

The fundamental tenet of logical empiricism is that the warrant for all scientific knowledge rests upon empirical evidence in conjunction with logic, where logic is taken to include induction or confirmation, as well as mathematics and formal logic (see evidence and confirmation). This appears to conflict strongly with Thomas Kuhn's famous statement that scientific theory choice depends on considerations that go beyond observation and logic, even when logic is construed so as to include confirmation (see kuhn and pragmatic factors in (...) theory acceptance). Logical empiricists deny the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge ‐ that is, substantive knowledge of the world based on pure reason. Those who, with W. V. Quine, reject the analytic/synthetic distinction, would, I suppose, question the possibility of a priori knowledge altogether (see quine). Contemporary logical empiricists disagree, however, about such basic issues as the nature of empirical evidence, the status and structure of confirmation or inductive inference, the nature of scientific explanation, and the character of scientific theories, to name but a few examples (see theories; explanation; confirmation, paradoxes of). (shrink)

Nishida Kitarō is considered Japan's first and greatest modern philosopher. As founder of the Kyoto School, he began a rigorous philosophical engagement and dialogue with Western philosophical traditions, especially the work of G. W. F. Hegel. John W. M. Krummel explores the Buddhist roots of Nishida’s thought and places him in connection with Hegel and other philosophers of the Continental tradition. Krummel develops notions of self-awareness, will, being, place, the environment, religion, and politics in Nishida’s thought and shows how his (...) ethics of humility may best serve us in our complex world. (shrink)

This article intends to identify and construct a Wesleyan perspective of business and entrepreneurship, drawing on how Wesley viewed and used business and entrepreneurship in relation to poverty in England, in order to identify helpful implications for the church which seeks to engage with poverty-related issues. Wesley did not repudiate or underestimate business and entrepreneurship in believers’ lives; rather, he provided believers with practical guidance and theological foundations for business and entrepreneurship particularly in the context of poverty. We (...) argue that Wesley should be viewed as a compassionate entrepreneur—with the compassion of a liberator and the practice of an entrepreneur, as he encouraged believers to actively participate in economic activities, and recognized entrepreneurship as a sustainable and significant way to empower the poor. Wesley’s example challenges the church today as his case study serves as a radical and faithful application of biblical economic teachings on business and entrepreneurship. (shrink)

It may seem a bit perverse to argue that pluralism is a kind of dogmatism, since pluralists invariably define themselves as antidogmatists. Indeed, the world would seem to be so well supplied with overt dogmatists—religious fanatics, militant revolutionaries, political and domestic tyrants—that it will probably seem unfair to suggest that the proponents of liberal, tolerant, civilized open-mindedness are guilty of a covert dogmatism. My only excuse for engaging in this exercise is that it may help to shake up some rather (...) firmly fixed ideas about dogmatism held by those who advocate some version of pluralism. Dogmatism, I want to argue, has had a very had press, some of it deserved, some of it based in misunderstandings and ignorance. Much of that bad press stems, I will suggest, from the dominance of pluralism as an intellectual ideology since the Enlightenment. If “dogmatism” is a synonym for irrationality, infelixibility, and authoritarianism, the fault lies as much with pluralism as it does with any actual dogmatism. I’d like to begin, therefore, with a definition of dogmatism that comes, not from its pluralist foes, but from a historian of religion who treats it as a fairly neutral term, describing a complex and ancient feature of social institutions. This definition comes from E. Royston Pike’s Encyclopedia of Religion and Religions:DOGMA . A religious doctrine that is to be received on authority—whether of a Divine revelation, a Church Council, Holy Scripture, or a great and honoured religious teacher—and not, at least in the first instance, because it may be proved true in the light of reason. Almost always there is associated with dogma the element of Faith. The term comes from the Greek word for “to seem,” and it meant originally that which seems true to anyone, i.e. has been approved or decided beyond cavil. In the New Testament it is applied to decisions of the Christian church in Jerusalem, enactments of the Jewish law, and imperial decrees, all of which were things to be accepted without argument. A little later it had come to mean simple statements of Christian belief and practice; and it was not until the 4th century, when the heretics were showing how far from simple the basic Christian beliefs really were, that it acquired the meaning of a theological interpretation of a religious fact. Then came the division of the Church into a Western and an Eastern branch, and never again was it possible to frame a dogma that might be universally held. The 39 Articles of the Church of England, the principles deduced from Calvin’s “Institutes” and John Wesley’s “Sermons,” and the items that compose the Mormon creed may all be classed as dogmas.1 W. J. T. Mitchell, editor of Critical Inquiry, is professor of English and a member of the Committee on Art and Design at the University of Chicago. His most recent book is Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology. (shrink)

In The Untamed God (2003), Jay Wesley Richards defends what he calls “theological essentialism,” which affirms God’s essential perfections but also recognizes contingent properties in God. This idea places Richards’s view in the vicinity of Charles Hartshorne’s dipolar theism. However, Richards argues that Hartshorne’s modal theory suffers from the defects that it abandons the principle ab esse ad posse, makes nonsense of our counter-factual discourse, and can only be expressed by C. I. Lewis’s S4, although for certain purposes Hartshorne (...) needs the stronger S5. Richards, however, fails to realize that Hartshorne’s theory involves two concepts of necessity—necessity as what is common to every possible world-state and necessity as it pertains to the unalterability of the past. While questions remain about Hartshorne’s theory, Richards’s arguments against it are unsuccessful. Most importantly, Richards uncritically accepts the concept of possible worlds as a basis for his critique, but Hartshorne’s arguments cast doubt on the coherence of this idea. Possible worlds provide anything but a firm foundation on which to make sense of either theological essentialism or Hartshorne’s panentheistic dipolar theism. (shrink)

The author is convinced that autobiography is revelatory of great cultural movements, and that the Christian faith is historically multi-dimensioned. Tsanoff has a marvelous facility to bring together diverse materials into a conceptual whole. He is capable of making St. Augustine representative of the patristic period and Newman of the Anglo-Catholic wing of the Church of England. In addition to these two Christian thinkers, Tsanoff portrays St. Teresa of Avila, George Fox, John Bunyan, John Wesley, Ernest Renan, count Tolstoy, (...) Albert Schweitzer, and Pope John XXIII. Each represents what Tsanoff calls an "alternative in Christian experience." And each describes in his own person a significant development in the ongoing life of the Christian community. Tsanoff's Autobiographies can be a very useful book, especially for courses dealing with the history of Christian thought. The author is faithful to the scholarly texts, quoting when necessary, providing anecdotes about the life of a theologian when illuminating. A good, substantial, interesting and helpful volume.--W. A. J. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay examines the experiences of three 19th-century African American travelers to Greece—David Dorr (1852), Frederick Douglass (1887), and John Wesley Gilbert (1890–1)—using evidence from their letters, diaries, and published writings. The essay shows that although each traveler's unique personal perspective shaped his response to seeing the ancient sites and monuments of Greece, all three men responded most deeply to a site connected with Greece's Christian heritage: the Areopagus or Mars Hill, where according to 19th-century understanding the Apostle Paul (...) had spoken the words recorded in the Book of Acts. (shrink)

Christianity and Modern Medicine raises moral questions that were merely hypothetical just decades ago. Moreover, traditional moral models are incessantly challenged by the medical community at large, shifting the conversation to patient and societal rights within a framework of moral relativism and rendering the decision-making process morally vague and confusing. In Christianity and Modern Medicine, bioethicist Mark Wesley Foreman and attorney Lindsay C. Leonard delve into the major ethical issues facing today's medical professionals with the purpose of providing principles (...) and guidelines for making critical ethical decisions where medical knowledge, technologies, and capabilities are constantly evolving. Topics covered include: procreational ethics, genetic ethics, abortion, medical research, infanticide, clinical ethics, physician-assisted suicide, legal issues. While Christianity and Modern Medicine is designed specifically for students planning careers in the medical field, it is accessible to any Christian interested in steering through the moral fog in the practice of medicine today. (shrink)

Taxation and government policy related to it have only episodic appearance in classical Protestant ethical sources. Of the early sixteenth century reformers, Luther gave most attention to the subject, justifying taxation in general as necessary for the just service of government to the public good and calling the princes to spend tax monies for that good rather than their own luxury. Calvin made much the same claims but called more clearly for official church scrutiny of all government than did Luther. (...) Two centuries later John Wesley criticized English tax policy, appealing to standards of economic efficiency and compassion for the poor with little reference overtly to theology. The churches of colonial and post-revolutionary America developed no systematic, theologically rooted rationale for taxation ethics, either; but official Protestant denominational concern for such ethics has grown measurably in the most recent fifteen years. After a survey of these recent national church statements, and on the basis of them and the slender Protestant heritage on this issue, we end by posing four questions which we see as worthy of much serious thinking by contemporary American Protestant ethicists and church bodies. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon's concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic, and which can be applied to the issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is (...) the author's contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon's philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science. (shrink)